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designed to be printed in color
*The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Min-
neapolis or the Federal Reserve System.When the United States won independence from Great Britain in 1786, the new coun-
try had only one bank. This did not remain the situation for long, however. By 1800, 28
banks were in existence. Over 250 more banks came into existence by 1820. The rapid
growth continued over the next two decades, and by 1840 the country had approximately 600
banks. Although the number of banks fell during the 1840s, there was a huge expansion in
the number of banks in the 1850s. As a result in 1860, just before the start of the Civil War,
the country had almost 1400 banks.
During the antebellum period, all banks had to be chartered by a state.1 Under these
state charters, banks were permitted to issue banknotes, which were dollar denominated
promises to pay specie to the bearer on demand. Banknotes circulated hand-to-hand and
were the largest component of the currency in circulation during the period.
Some examples of banknotes are displayed in Figure 1. As the ﬁgure shows, banknotes
were distinguishable by the issuing bank, this meant that throughout the antebellum period,
there were large numbers of diﬀerent currencies in existence in the country.
In general, the notes of diﬀerent banks did not circulate at par against each other.
Further, the exchange rates between notes of diﬀe r e n tb a n k sw e r en o tc o n s t a n to v e rt i m e .
These facts are known through contemporary publications. Several newspapers contained
“Bank Note Tables” that listed the rates of discount or premium on the notes of banks
throughout the country in terms of notes of banks of that city. In addition, there were
publications that specialized in reporting on banknote prices and counterfeits, which were
known generally as “Bank Note Reporters and Counterfeit Detectors.” Bank note reporters
1There were two exceptions: The (First) Bank of the United States, 1801-1811 and the (Second) Bank of
the United States, 1816 - 1836, which were chartered by the federal government.were usually published by or in collaboration with a broker in a particular city.
The existence of a large number of currencies circulating at ﬂoating exchange rates has
led many to view the banking arrangements during this period as an impediment to trade and
economic growth. This was true of some contemporary observers. For example, Senator John
Sherman of Ohio used the following quote from the London Times i nas p e e c ho nF e b r u a r y
10, 1863, advocating passage of the National Currency Act:
By the want of a paper currency that would be taken in every State of the Union
at its nominal value the Americans have suﬀered severely. The diﬀerent States
were, as to their bank notes, so many foreign countries, each refusing the paper
of the others, except at continually varying rates of discount.... Only adepts and
regular money-changers could tell whether a note was current or not, the paper
of broken or suspended banks remaining in circulation long after their value had
departed. Through [a national currency] the people will ... gain that deliverance
from the previous confusion of their currency which to Europeans appeared a
barbarism.
The same view is shared by some more recent writers. For example, Phillip Cagan
(1963) asserts:
The nation could not so easily have achieved its rapid industrial and commercial
expansion during the second half of the 19th century with the fragmented currency
system it had during the ﬁrst half....
This view led many to advocate that the solution was a uniform currency for the
country, and such a solution was imposed on the country with the passage of the National
2Currency Act (later called the National Banking Act) in 1863 and the passage of the 10
percent tax on state banknotes levied beginning in 1866. These two pieces of legislation
eﬀectively drove state bank notes out of circulation. They were replaced by the notes of
national banks, all of which had the same general appearance and circulated at par with each
other.
However, theory does not necessarily suggest that the existence of discounts or pre-
miums — even ﬂuctuating discounts or premiums — on notes with the same face value are
undesirable from a welfare perspective (Smith and Weber, 1999; Wallace, 2001). Thus, a
question that one would eventually like to answer is whether the national banking system
was a welfare improvement over to system of state chartered banks.
Unfortunately this paper cannot answer that question. Instead, it presents two ﬁndings
about the structure of the markets for banknotes and about the determination of banknote
exchange rates that should be confronted by any model that purports to answer it.
One ﬁnding of this paper is that the currency system was not as fragmented as would
be suggested by the huge number of banks in existence. Instead, there were many fewer
“currencies” than there were distinct bank notes, because there were several groups of banks
whose notes always had the same exchange rate quotation. In some cases, there existed
interbank arrangements regarding banknotes that led to this outcome. These arrangements
arose both endogenously and through government legislation. In other cases, apparently just
the fact that banks were in the same geographic location, usually a city or a state, led to this
outcome.
The second ﬁnding of this paper is that the levels of exchange rates and ﬂuctuations
in exchange rates appear to have been driven by fundamentals. Once account is taken of
3the interbank arrangements regarding bank note redemption, exchange rates appear to be
roughly determined by the net redemption value of a note — the expected rate at which
the note would be redeemed for specie less the cost of redeeming the note at the issuing
bank.2 Thus, banknote exchange rates do not appear to have exhibited the type of exchange
rate indeterminacy that exists in the ﬁat money models of Kareken and Wallace (19xx) or
the commodity money model of Velde and Weber (2000). Further, ﬂuctuations in banknote
exchange rates do not appear to be due to intrinsic uncertainty as is suggested by the ﬁndings
of Meese and Rogoﬀ (19xx) and modelled by King, Wallace, and Weber (19xx) for today’s
ﬁat moneys.
However, I also ﬁnd an important exception to the ﬁnding that net redemption values
determined banknote exchange rates. This exception is that net trade ﬂows between various
regions of the country also were important determinants of bank note exchange rates.3
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section contains a description of the data on
bank note exchange rates underlying this study. The next section presents evidence on how
fractured the currency system actually was by describing groups of banks whose notes always
had the same exchange rate quotation. The fourth section presents evidence supporting the
fundamentals explanation of the determination of banknote exchange rates. The ﬁfth section
shows that net trade ﬂows between various regions also help explain exchange rates. The
ﬁnal section concludes.
2Gorton (20xx) expresses this same view and presents some empirical evidence supporting it. However,
the evidence he presents is far less extensive than that presented here.
3Note that the relative quantities of notes of individual banks are not among these fundamental deter-
minants of exchange rate as would be the case in the so-called monetary theories of exchange rates. This
implication follows directly from the fact that exchanges rates of many banks banks are identical to each
other even though their relative circulations vary over time.
41. Data
The data for this study are exchange rates on individual banknotes as quoted in four
locations — Philadelphia, New York, Cincinnati, and Cleveland. The data for Philadelphia is
monthly for the period August 1830 through January 1831 and August 1832 through 1858.
The data up to xxx 183x is from Bicknell’s. The later data are all from Van Courts.
The data for New York is generally bimonthly. It is for the period July 1839 through
December 1848. There are also some selected observations for the 1850s. The data for the
1830s and 40s are from Shipping & commercial list (and New-York price current);t h el a t e r
data are from Thompsons.
The four observations for Cincinnati are February 1841 and June 1846 from Goodman’s
Western Counterfeit Detector and Bank Note Table, February 1850 from Lord’s Bradley &
Co.’s Cincinnati Counterfeit Detector and Bank Note Reporter, and July 1854 from Lord’s
Detector and Bank Note Reporter. The single observation for Cleveland is January 1856 from
the Cleveland Bank Note Reporter published by Pierce &Co., bankers.
The quoted discounts and premiums are the exchange rates for notes of banks through-
out the country in terms of notes of banks in the particular city where the bank note reporter
is published. They are not exchange rates of bank notes for specie. When banks are redeem-
ing their notes for specie, this diﬀerence is not important. However, as I show below, it makes
ad i ﬀerence when banks have suspended specie payment on their notes.
The focus in the paper is only on exchange rates for notes of banks that are actually
in business. Quotes for the notes of banks that are “closed,” “winding up,” or “broken” are
not taken into account. After these the quotes for such banks are eliminated, I have over
200,000 individual exchange rate observations covering over 2000 banks.
52. How fragmented was the currency system?
In this section, I document that there were many fewer “currencies” than there were
distinct bank notes. To do this, I identify for Philadelphia and New York City groups of
banks that always had the same exchange rate against the notes of banks in those cities.
For both cities I am able to identify several such groups, each of which included a large
number of individual banks. I also discuss whether these grouping appear to have been due
to the existence of some explicit interbank arrangements regarding banknotes or whether
they appear to have been simply due to the fact that the banks were in the same geographic
location, usually a city or a state.
A. Philadelphia
Contemporary sources give the impression that bank notes circulated at par in the
local area. This is conﬁrmed in the data. With only a single exception the notes of the
between 13 and 20 Philadelphia banks that existed during the period covered by my data
went at par against each other in Philadelphia.
Further, the data show that the area in which there was par circulation of banknotes
was larger than just the ﬁnancial center itself. Many county banks had arrangements with
banks in ﬁnancial centers to redeem their notes at par. Banks whose notes were redeemed
at par in Philadelphia were listed in Van Court’s beginning in the 1850s. Figure 2 shows
the location of 47 banks that I identify from these tables as having had banknote redemp-
tion arrangements with a Philadelphia bank. As expected, Pennsylvania banks in towns
near Philadelphia arranged to have their notes redeemed in that city, as did New Jersey
banks located near Philadelphia. Every bank in Delaware also had an arrangement with a
6Philadelphia bank to redeem its notes at par.
The bank note price data also indicate that most of these par redemption arrangements
existed prior to the 1850s. The notes of the banks identiﬁed above as being redeemed at par in
Philadelphia were listed as being at par against Philadelphia banknotes for every observation
in my sample, with only a very few exceptions.
The banks described above are the only ones whose notes consistently traded at par
with each other in Philadelphia. There are no blocks of banks whose notes traded at the
same constant discount or premium over time. However, there several large blocks of banks
whose notes always had the same exchange rate against the notes of Philadelphia banks, even
though this exchange rate varied over time.
One of these blocks consists of virtually all banks in Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, and Vermont. There were about 170 banks in this block in the 1830s; the
number expanded to about 400 banks in 1858. I attribute this uniformity of the quoted
exchange rates on the notes of these banks to the fact that all were members of the Suﬀolk
Banking System in New England. [add a brief description] I also interpret this uniformity
of exchange rates as conﬁrming the impression from contemporary sources that the notes of
banks that were members of the Suﬀolk Banking System went at par against each other in
New England.
The above bank redemption arrangements were endogenous developments. During
this period, there was also a governmentally imposed banknote redemption arrangement that
aﬀected the exchange rates between banknotes. On February 25, 1845, the Ohio legislature
passed “The Act to Incorporate the State Bank of Ohio and other banking companies.” This
established the State Bank of Ohio and also a class of banks called Independent Banks. Inde-
7pendent Banks were required to redeem the notes of the State Bank and other Independent
Banks at par (Huntington, 1915, p. 497). Later, “Free Banks” were permitted under an act
passed on March 21, 1851. Free banks were required to redeem the notes of each other at
par. (Huntington, 1915, p. 500) These banks ﬁrst appear in the data in April 1846, and,
excepting banks that are closed, the notes of these banks always quoted at the same discount
in Philadelphia.
The major cities in the county during this period generally had several banks, and the
notes of these banks generally had a uniform, but time-varying quoted discount against notes
of Philadelphia banks.4 Speciﬁcally, New York City had between 15 and 60 banks, and the
discounts on their notes were always the same. Baltimore had between 9 to 15 banks, and
their notes had the same discount in Philadelphia after 1842. Prior to that, one or two banks
have slightly diﬀerent discounts in almost every month. In New Orleans, all banks had the
same discount with only a few of exceptions.5
I have also found some states for which the notes of the various banks had uniform but
time-varying discounts or premiums. One of these was North Carolina, which had between
3 and 14 banks during the period covered by the data. Another state was Kentucky, which
had a maximum of 9 banks during this period.
4Using the criterion that a major city is one with a population in excess of 100,000 in 1850, the major
cities in the county during this period, other than Philadelphia, were New York City, Baltimore, New Orleans,
Boston, and Cincinnati. Boston and Cincinnati are omitted from the discussion in this paragraph because
the were covered in the discussion of New England and Ohio, respectively.
5The exceptions are that in 1842, New Orleans banks had varied discounts. From January 1843 through
July 1849, there were two classes of banks. Roughly twelve with the same small discounts and three with large
discounts. These three disappear from the sample after July 1849 and it is unclear whether all three were in
business after January 1843. The Bank of Orleans closed about that time. The aﬀairs of the Consolidated
Association of the Planters of Louisiana’s aﬀairs had been in the process of being wound up by the state since
1842. According to Haxby, however, the other one of these three banks, the Citizens Bank of Louisiana, was
in business during this period.
8U n l i k et h ec a s eo ft h eS u ﬀolk Banking System or Ohio, to this point I have been unable
to ﬁnd any explicit bank note redemption arrangements to account for the similarly of bank
note discounts for these geographical areas. One could argue that for the major cities the
identical discounts are explained by the fact that the cost of redeeming notes was essentially
the same, that good information on the ﬁnancial viability banks was available on a timely
basis, and that if bank suspensions were to occur, all banks in the city would suspend, not
just an isolated bank. However, such an argument seems far less applicable to North Carolina
and Kentucky, where the banks were scattered throughout the state.
Other than the blocks of banks noted above, there do not appear to be other regions
with large numbers of banks that had uniform, time-varying discounts against the notes of
Philadelphia banks. (At this point, I have not checked New York carefully enough to know
if this statement holds for it.) In particular, other than the banks that had par redemption
arrangements with a Philadelphia bank, the exchange rates for notes of other banks in New
Jersey and Pennsylvania varied from bank-to-bank. The same is true for the exchange rates
of notes of banks in Maryland located outside Baltimore.
Another point to note is that the uniformity of discounts for geographical areas does
not seem to cross state lines with the exception of New England.
B. New York City
The same similarity of bank discounts for the notes of groups of banks that appears
in the data for Philadelphia also appears in the data for New York City. The notes of all of
the banks in New York City always were quoted at par against each other, conﬁrming the
conventional wisdom that notes circulated at par in the local area.
9Also, as was the case for Philadelphia, the bank note reporters for New York City
carried lists of banks whose notes were redeemed at par there. From these lists, I identify101
banks as having had redemption arrangements with a New York City bank The locations of
these banks are shown also in Figure 2. The New York banks with these arrangements are
located in towns near New York City. The same is true for New Jersey banks. Banks in three
cities — Allentown and Easton in Pennsylvania and Trenton, New Jersey — arranged to have
their notes redeemed at par in both cities. Note that New Jersey banks are split between
those having their notes redeemed in Philadelphia and those having their notes redeemed
in New York City. While this seems to be generally dictated by which ﬁnancial was closer,
I also hypothesize that transportation routes, especially railroad lines, played a major role
in this determination. Support for this hypothesis is the three banks that had redemption
arrangements in both city. Each of these lay on major railroad lines to both Philadelphia
and New York City.
Also, as was the case for Philadelphia, the exchange rates for all of the banks in New
England are always the same in New York City, although these notes are not at par. Further,
the exchange rates for all Ohio banks, Philadelphia banks, Baltimore banks, North Carolina
banks, and Kentucky banks are the same, although these rates vary by group and over time.
For New Orleans banks, their notes are all at the same rate of discount. However, from
August 1844 through August 1846 there is a category of banks listed as “Other banks in
state (not sound)” that carries a substantially higher discount. This seems consistent with
the data from Philadelphia.
103. Exchange rates determined by fundamentals
In this section, I present three pieces of evidence that banknote exchange rates were
determined by fundamentals in the sense that the exchange rate on banknotes of a particular
bank equaled the net redemption value of the notes — the expected rate at which notes could
be redeemed for specie less the cost of redeeming notes.
The ﬁrst piece of evidence is the level of discounts on banknotes. During periods in
which banks are not suspended, if exchange rates are determined by fundamentals, banknote
discounts should increase with the cost of returning a note to the issuing bank. The evidence
s h o w st h a tt h i si sr o u g h l yt h ec a s e .
The locations of banks in New England, New York, and the middle Atlantic states by
the average discount on their notes in terms of Philadelphia bank notes over the period 1844
to 1858 are plotted in Figure 3.6 I choose the period 1844 to 1858 over which to take the
average, because it is one during which banks are always redeeming their notes, except for
a brief time in late 1857. The average discounts for the banks covered in this ﬁgure are 1
percent or less, except for a few locations in western Pennsylvania.
Once account is taken of banknote redemption arrangements, the ﬁgure shows that
banknote discounts generally increase with redemption costs. Consider ﬁrst the major cities.
During this period, New York City was likely the cheapest one to get to from Philadelphia, and
discounts on the notes of banks located there averaged slightly less than 1
10 percent. Baltimore
was likely to next cheapest, and discounts on banks located there averaged 1
4percent. Boston
was likely the next cheapest, and discounts on notes there, and in all of New England because
6The plot of locations for New York and Rhode Island is incomplete at this time. Those plotted for New
York are only those locations which had par redemption arrangements with New York City banks as identiﬁed
in Figure 2. Only Providence is plotted for Rhode Island.
11of the Suﬀolk Banking System, averaged 3
8 percent. With regard to other banks, under
the assumption that redemption costs increase with distance, the further a bank is from
Philadelphia, the greater should be the discount on its notes. This is generally the case for
individual banks in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. The exceptions, like the location with
an average 7
8 percent discount in northeastern Pennsylvania (Honesdale), very likely can be
explained by examining the railroad or canal access to those locations compared to that for
locations further from Philadelphia but with lower discounts.
Ih a v ea l s op l o t t e dt h el o c a t i o no fab a n kw i t ha1 0p e r c e n td i s c o u n tt os h o wt h ee ﬀect
of the Suﬀolk Banking System on exchange rates. The bank is the Calais Bank, located in
eastern Maine. It was not a member of the Suﬀolk Banking System. A nearby bank, which
was a member, had a discount that averaged only 3
8 percent.
The locations of banks in the South and West by the average discount on their notes
in terms of Philadelphia bank notes over the same period are plotted in Figure 4.7 Here
the average discounts are almost uniformly higher, all but one above 1 percent. Since these
banks are generally located further from Philadelphia than are the banks in Figure 3, this is
consistent with exchange rates being determined by fundamentals.
However, there is also some evidence in Figure 4 that is not consistent with the fun-
damentals explanation. For one, banks in New Orleans and St. Louis have lower average dis-
count than banks in Indiana and Ohio despite being much further down the Ohio-Mississippi
waterway. For another, banks in North Carolina have a higher average discount that banks in
South Carolina. And banks in Mobile have a lower average discount than banks in Nashville.
7The plot of locations for Tennessee is incomplete; only Nashville is plotted. Also, only Indianapolis, the
main oﬃce of the State Bank of Indiana, is plotted.
12[The plots of bank location by average discounts as quoted in New York City will be
presented in Figures 5 and 6. But these ﬁgures are not yet available.]
The evidence above was on levels of discounts on banknotes. The comovements of
banknote exchange rates also support the proposition that banknote exchange rates were
determined by fundamentals. I computed the correlations between the exchange rates of the
notes of banks in various regions as quoted in Philadelphia over the entire sample period. I was
able to identify four regions in which the movements of banknotes exchange rates were highly
correlated (greater than 0.8). The four regions were Pennsylvania, excluding Philadelphia and
locations with banks with redemption arrangements with Philadelphia banks; New England,
excluding Rhode Island, New York, and New Jersey, again excluding locations with banks
with redemption arrangements with Philadelphia banks; states located along the Ohio and
Mississippi rivers; and the Middle Atlantic states, excluding the city of Baltimore.
I take the fact that there were several regions in which banknote exchange rate changes
were highly correlated to be evidence that these exchange rates were determined by funda-
mentals for two reasons. The ﬁrst has to do with the cost of getting a note back to the issuing
bank. Changes in the cost of transportation should have wide geographic eﬀects. For exam-
ple, a lowering of the cost of going down the Ohio River should lower the cost of redeeming
the notes of banks all along that route, not just banks in a single city or state. The same
should be true for the opening of a new canal or rail line. Thus, changes in transportation
costs should aﬀect the cost of returning notes to banks over a wide geographic area, and the
discounts on the notes of all banks in that geographical area should be aﬀected at roughly
t h es a m et i m ea n dt ot h es a m ee x t e n t .
The second reason has to do with the expected redemption value of a banknote. Dur-
13ing this period, bank suspensions usually started in started in one city. However, they spread
quickly to other cities. Further, when the banks in the ﬁnancial center of some region sus-
pended, country banks in that region suspended as well. Thus, bank suspensions were not
isolated by cities or even states. For example, the bank suspensions in the Panic of 1837
began in Natchez on May 4, 1837. On May 10, the banks in New York City suspended. The
next day, the banks in Albany, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Hartford, and New Haven suspended.
Banks in Boston, Newport, and Mobile suspended on May 11. Thus, redemption rates on
banknotes should tend to move together over wide geographic regions during those times
when banks suspended specie payments on their notes.
The third piece of evidence supporting the proposition that bank note exchange rates
were determined by fundamentals is the behavior of these exchange rates during a period in
which banks in one part of the country were suspended and banks in another part were not.
There is one such the episode during the period covered by the data. It occurred between
May 1837 and the end of 1842.
As mentioned above, banks throughout the country suspended specie payments in
May 1837. Banks in New York City resumed specie payments on May 10, 1838; Philadelphia
banks did not resume until August 13 of that year. On October 9, 1839, Philadelphia banks
suspended again. They resumed specie payments in January 1841, but this lasted only brieﬂy.
They suspended again and did not resume until March 17, 1842. New York City banks, in
contrast, continued to redeem their notes in specie through the time that Philadelphia banks
were suspended for the second time.
The pattern of Philadelphia suspensions is reﬂected in the discounts on the notes
of Philadelphia banks as quoted in New York City. This is shown in Figure 7, where the
14discounts on Philadelphia bank notes as quoted in New York City as shown for the period
July 1839 through December 1842. When Philadelphia banks suspend in October 1839, the
discount on their notes in New York City goes from 1
2percent to 14 percent. This discount
stays above 1-1
2percent until the brief resumption in January 1841 when it again is 1
2percent.
The discount jumps to 4 percent in the next month, reﬂecting the fact that Philadelphia
banks are again suspended. When Philadelphia banks resume specie payments in March
1842, the discounts on their notes return to 1
2percent, the level prior to October 1839.
During this same period, Virginia banks followed the same pattern of suspensions
and as Philadelphia banks, except that they did not ﬁnally resume specie payments until
September 1842. The modal discount on the notes of Virginia banks as quoted in Philadelphia
for the period 1835 through 1842 is shown in Figure 8. What the ﬁg u r es h o w si st h a tt h e s e
discounts, which had been 7 percent or less, jumped to 12 percent when Philadelphia banks
resumed specie payments, but the Virginia banks did not.
Although the discount on Virginia banknotes jumped when banks there were sus-
pended and banks in Philadelphia were not, Figure 8 also shows that the discount on these
notes was roughly similar in those periods when banks in both locations were redeeming or
suspended. That is, with the exception of the spikes in May 1837 and October 1839, the
discounts prior to May 1837 and from August 1838 to October 1839 when banks in both
locations are redeeming their notes are similar to the discounts from May 1837 to August
1838 and from October 1839 to March 1842 when banks in both locations are suspended.
This result seems reasonable, because the exchange rates were banknote/banknote,
not banknote/specie. The redemption process involved taking the banknote back to the
location of the issuing bank where it was exchanged for gold. If banks there are redeeming,
15the exchange was at par. If they were suspended, it was discounted against gold. The gold
was then taken back to the location of the exchange rate quote. If banks there were not
suspended, the gold exchanged at par for local banknotes. If banks were not redeeming,
it exchanged at a premium for local banknotes. This premium roughly cancelled out the
discount in the “foreign” location, so that the exchange rate would be the same also long as
banks in both locations were either suspended or redeeming.
The spikes in May 1837 and October 1839 are seeming exceptions to this story. How-
ever, because they occur at the beginning of periods when banks in both locations are sus-
pended, they may simply reﬂect increased uncertainty about the banking situation in the
“foreign” location that occurs at the beginning of any banking crisis. If this explanation is
correct, the fact that discount rates return to pre-suspension levels in a few months shows
that this uncertainty is quickly resolved.
4. Trade ﬂows
Thus far, I have not made use of the exchange rate quotations from Cincinnati and
Cleveland. The reason is that the paucity of data makes it diﬃcult to discern patterns as
was possible with the quotations from Philadelphia and New York City.
Nonetheless, there is one regularity in the data from these two cities. The discounts on
the notes of Cincinnati and Cleveland banks in Philadelphia and New York City were always
larger than discounts in Cincinnati and Cleveland on the notes of banks in Philadelphia
and New York City. In fact, when banks in all four cities were redeeming, the notes of
Philadelphia and New York City went at par in Cincinnati and Cleveland. This is shown in
Table 1. The discounts on the notes of Cincinnati and Cleveland banks in Philadelphia and
16New York City were always at least 4 percent. However, the notes of Philadelphia and New
York City banks were at par in Cincinnati and Cleveland, except in February 1841, when
they were at a 3-1
2percent premium in Cincinnati. The diﬀerence between February 1841 and
the dates of the other observations is that this is a time when the banks in Cincinnati were
suspended whereas the banks in Philadelphia and New York City were redeeming. All banks
were redeeming at the times of the other observations.
Philadelphia and New York were more important ﬁnancial centers than Cincinnati or
Cleveland, and I hypothesize that the balance of trade during this period favored those cities,
and as a result made the notes of banks in those cities more valuable. As an example, consider
an agent in Cincinnati being oﬀered a note of a Philadelphia bank. Under my assumption
about trade ﬂows, this agent would want to buy goods in Philadelphia. As a result, he would
be willing to take that note at par to use to buy goods in Philadelphia. The note would not
go through the redemption process. In contrast, an agent in Philadelphia being oﬀered the
note of a Cincinnati bank would not have a demand for goods in Cincinnati. Thus, he would
discount the note by the cost of redeeming the note for gold there.
Some further evidence in support of this hypothesis is given in Figure 9, where I plot
the exchange rates of Philadelphia banknotes in New York City against the exchange rates
of New York City banknotes in Philadelphia. The discounts on Philadelphia banknotes in
New York City are almost always higher, consistent with New York City being a more major
ﬁnancial center than Philadelphia.
175. Conclusion
This paper is based on an extensive data set on banknote exchange rates in the ante-
bellum United States as quoted in Philadelphia, New York City, Cincinnati, and Cleveland.
It uses this data set to examine the question of how fragmented this currency system actually
was. The paper shows that the currency system was not as fragmented as would be suggested
by taking a naive view that the notes of each bank were a separate currency and that ex-
change rates on banknotes were subject to intrinsic uncertainty as seems to be the case with
modern ﬁat currencies. The paper ﬁnds that in many cases there would groups of currencies
that were always identical. It also ﬁnds that banknote exchange rates were determined by
fundamentals.
Nonetheless, one should not minimize the complexity of currency exchange during this
period. Even taking account that there were groups of currencies that were identical, there
were still a large number of currencies around. And there was exchange rate uncertainty.
Further, given the large number of currencies, it was relatively easy to make a counterfeit
currency either by inventing a nonexistent bank with a name similar to an existing bank or
by altering the notes of a real one. The long lists of counterfeits in the Bank Note Reporters
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Figure 2 -- Location of banks with Par Redemption 
in Philadelphia or New York City
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Figure 3 -- Location of Eastern banks








































































Figure 4 -- Location of Southern and Western banks











# 7/8Figure 7 -- Monthly modal discounts on Philadephia 














tFigure 8 -- Monthly modal discounts on Virginia 



































Feb 1841 6 -3.5
June 1846 6 0
Feb 1850 7 0
July 1854 5 0
Cin/NYC NYC/Cin
Feb 1841 9 -3.5
June 1846 4 0
Cleve/Phila Phila/Cleve
Jan 1856 4 0
Table 1 -- Discounts on XX notes/ in YY